Introduction

Taqī ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah al-Ḥarrānī (661-728 AH / 1263-1328 CE) was born in Ḥarrān in the Jazīrah region and raised in Damascus, where his family had relocated following the Mongol advance into the eastern Islamic world. He was trained in the Ḥanbalī legal school and in Atharī theology, studying under his father and other leading scholars of his era before establishing himself as one of the most prolific and influential legal and theological minds in Islamic history. His output spans jurisprudence, theology, Quranic exegesis, Sufism, polemics, and political theory. His treatise on the principle of al-amr bil-maʿrūf wan-nahy ʿan al-munkar (enjoining right and forbidding wrong) was composed within a scholarly and political context in which the relationship between individual duty, communal obligation, and state authority was a matter of acute practical significance, as Ibn Taymiyyah himself lived through periods of political upheaval, military threat from the Mongols, and internal doctrinal contestation within the Muslim world.

The treatise examines one of the collective obligations (farḍ kifāyah) most frequently cited in the Qurʾān and Sunnah: the duty of Muslims to command what Allāh has commanded and to prohibit what Allāh has prohibited. Ibn Taymiyyah begins with the Quranic foundations of this obligation, including the verse of Āl ʿImrān that describes the Muslim community as the best of communities precisely because it fulfills this duty. He then proceeds to analyze in detail the conditions under which an individual Muslim may or must act, the permissible means of doing so, and the circumstances in which acting would be prohibited because the resulting harm would outweigh the benefit. The treatise engages extensively with the hadith literature, the opinions of the Companions, and the reasoning of earlier jurists, situating Ibn Taymiyyah's own conclusions within a careful reading of the tradition. The question of when a Muslim is obliged to act by hand, by tongue, or by heart, and when capacity and anticipated outcome modify those obligations, receives sustained and rigorous treatment.

This treatise holds a significant place in the Islamic jurisprudential tradition. It is among the most detailed classical treatments of a principle that appears in multiple Quranic verses and in numerous authenticated hadith, including the well-known narration of ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd in which the Prophet, upon him be peace, described changing an evil by the hand, the tongue, or the heart as the three levels of faith. Ibn Taymiyyah's analysis has been studied by scholars across the Sunni legal schools, and his nuanced treatment of conditions and exceptions has been cited by later scholars seeking to understand when the obligation applies and when it is suspended or modified. The work also reflects Ibn Taymiyyah's characteristic integration of legal reasoning with theological principle, grounding the entire discussion in the overarching objectives of the Sharīʿah (maqāṣid) and the principle of weighing benefit against harm.

A reader approaching this treatise should bear in mind that it is a work of advanced legal and theological reasoning, and that its arguments presuppose familiarity with the primary sources of Islām and with the methodological principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Those new to the subject will benefit from reading an introductory text on uṣūl al-fiqh before engaging directly with Ibn Taymiyyah's analysis. The most rewarding approach is to read each section alongside the Quranic verses and hadith it cites, consulting a reliable tafsīr for context. The treatise remains relevant not merely as a historical document but as a practical guide for Muslims seeking to understand the scope and limits of their responsibility to uphold good and resist wrongdoing in their communities, doing so with wisdom, compassion, and a clear understanding of what the scholars of Islām have established on this question.