Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada)

# Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada)

The Oslo Process and Its Limits

To understand the Second Intifada, one must understand the failed peace process that preceded it. The Oslo Accords of 1993, signed on the White House lawn by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, had created the Palestinian Authority and outlined a framework for Palestinian self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza with a final-status agreement to be negotiated within five years. Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and borders were deferred to final-status negotiations — the most difficult issues left for last.

The five years passed without a final agreement. Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank continued and accelerated throughout the Oslo period, undermining Palestinian confidence in the process. In July 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a summit at Camp David between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, attempting to reach a comprehensive final-status agreement. The summit failed. The precise details of what was offered and rejected are disputed, but the fundamental issues — the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the extent of Palestinian sovereignty — could not be bridged.

The failure of Camp David, after seven years of a peace process that had raised Palestinian expectations, produced a profound disillusionment. The Palestinian population had endured the Oslo years with growing frustration as settlements expanded, freedom of movement was restricted, and the promised state remained a mirage.

Ariel Sharon's Visit and the Triggering Incident

On September 28, 2000 CE / Jumada al-Akhira 1421 AH, Ariel Sharon — then leader of Israel's Likud opposition party — visited the Al-Haram al-Sharif compound (the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary) in Jerusalem with an escort of approximately one thousand Israeli police and security personnel. The visit was deliberately provocative: Sharon was a figure deeply associated with Israeli settlement expansion and with the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre (in which Lebanese Christian militiamen, operating under Israeli military supervision, killed hundreds of Palestinian civilians in Beirut refugee camps — Sharon was found by an Israeli commission to bear "personal responsibility").

Palestinians interpreted Sharon's visit as a political statement — an assertion of Israeli sovereignty over the Al-Aqsa compound. The following day, September 29, Palestinian protesters clashed with Israeli police at Al-Aqsa after Friday prayers. Israeli forces used live ammunition; four Palestinians were killed and hundreds wounded. The Al-Aqsa Intifada had begun.

The Al-Aqsa Mosque and Its Islamic Significance

The significance of the intifada's name — Al-Aqsa — reflects the central Islamic importance of the site. Al-Masjid al-Aqsa is the third holiest mosque in Islam, referenced in the Quran in the verse of the Night Journey (17:1), the destination of the Prophet ﷺ before the Mi'raj, and the first qibla of the Muslim community. Any perceived threat to Muslim access to or sovereignty over Al-Aqsa is experienced by Muslims worldwide not merely as a political provocation but as an attack on the sacred.

The Waqf authority — the Jordanian-administered Islamic Endowment that manages the Al-Aqsa compound — has maintained Muslim religious administration of the site since 1967. However, Israeli restrictions on who may enter the compound (at various times restricting entry to men over 50, then over 40, then over 35, etc.), periodic closures, and archaeological work in tunnels beneath and adjacent to the mosque have generated repeated crises. The Palestinian population's sensitivity to any Israeli presence at or near Al-Aqsa is therefore grounded in both Islamic conviction and decades of experience of restrictions on Muslim worship at the site.

Violence and Countermeasures

The Al-Aqsa Intifada was significantly more lethal than the First Intifada (1987-1993). The earlier intifada had been characterized primarily by stone-throwing, commercial strikes, and civil disobedience. The second involved suicide bombings in Israeli civilian areas, ambushes on settler roads, and firefights between Palestinian gunmen and Israeli forces.

Palestinian factions operating in the uprising included the al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas's military wing), Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (affiliated with Fatah). Suicide bombings struck Israeli buses, restaurants, hotels, and markets. The Sbarro restaurant bombing in Jerusalem (August 2001), the Dolphinarium nightclub bombing in Tel Aviv (June 2001), and the Park Hotel Passover massacre in Netanya (March 2002) were among the most devastating attacks. Over the course of the intifada, more than 1,000 Israelis were killed, the majority civilians.

Israel's military response was overwhelming. Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) sent Israeli forces back into West Bank cities that had been under Palestinian Authority control under the Oslo Accords. The Jenin refugee camp saw fierce urban combat. The Palestinian Authority's infrastructure — security headquarters, ministries, even presidential compound buildings — was systematically destroyed. Arafat was besieged in his Ramallah compound (the Muqata'a) for months. Israeli forces conducted targeted assassinations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, including the killing of Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (2004) and his successor Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi (2004).

Palestinian deaths over the course of the intifada exceeded 3,000. The Palestinian economy collapsed; movement restrictions imposed by Israel's closure policy made normal economic life impossible. The psychological and material damage to Palestinian society was severe.

The Separation Barrier

Israel began construction of the West Bank separation barrier (variously called the "security fence" by Israel and the "apartheid wall" by Palestinians) in 2002. The barrier — partly a concrete wall and partly electronic fence — does not follow the 1949 Green Line (the internationally recognized boundary between Israel and the West Bank) but extends into West Bank territory, effectively annexing large areas of Palestinian land including agricultural fields and villages. The International Court of Justice ruled in 2004 that the barrier's route (where it deviates from the Green Line) was illegal under international law. Israel did not comply with the ruling.

The barrier dramatically reduced suicide bombing attacks inside Israel proper, achieving its immediate security purpose. Its consequences for Palestinians included the separation of farmers from their land, the division of communities, and the de facto annexation of approximately 10% of the West Bank on the Israeli side of the barrier.

Hamas, Fatah, and Palestinian Political Split

Yasser Arafat's death on November 11, 2004 — under disputed circumstances while besieged in his compound — removed the central unifying figure of Palestinian politics. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) succeeded him as PLO chairman and was elected Palestinian Authority president in January 2005. The intifada gradually wound down through 2005.

In January 2006, Hamas won a landslide victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections — a genuine democratic outcome recognized by international election observers. Hamas's victory reflected Palestinian disillusionment with Fatah's corruption and the failure of the peace process. The international response — the United States, European Union, and Israel refusing to recognize the Hamas government and implementing a financial boycott — demonstrated the limits of international support for Palestinian democracy when its results were inconvenient.

After months of growing tension, Hamas took control of Gaza by force in June 2007. Fatah retained control of the West Bank. The Palestinian national movement split into two competing governments — Fatah in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza — a division that has persisted and complicated Palestinian political strategy ever since.

Israel, Egypt, and the international community imposed a blockade on Gaza, restricting the movement of goods and people, following Hamas's takeover. Gaza's 2 million residents have lived under blockade for over fifteen years.

Islamic Significance and Scholarly Positions

The Al-Aqsa Intifada's name reflects a reality that Muslim scholars take seriously: the centrality of Al-Aqsa Mosque to Islamic theology and identity. Scholars across the Sunni world affirmed the Islamic obligation to resist the occupation of Muslim lands, defend Muslim holy sites, and support the Palestinian people. The question of the legitimacy of specific tactics — particularly suicide bombings targeting civilians — generated extensive scholarly debate, with most mainstream Sunni scholars condemning attacks on non-combatant civilians while affirming the legitimacy of resistance to occupation generally.

The Second Intifada, like the first, ended without achieving Palestinian statehood or liberation of Jerusalem. Its legacy includes the separation barrier, the Hamas-Fatah split, the Gaza blockade, and the further consolidation of the settlement enterprise. For Muslims worldwide, Al-Aqsa remains occupied, and the obligation to work for its liberation — through whatever means Islamic jurisprudence permits — remains.

Sources: Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (Simon & Schuster, 2006); Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Beacon Press, 2006); B'Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), Statistics on fatalities, Al-Aqsa Intifada; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004); Sara Roy, Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (Pluto Press, 2007); Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher (eds.), Bitterlemons.org