# Suez Crisis

Egypt, the Canal, and the Road to Nationalization

The Suez Canal, opened in 1869, was one of the most strategically significant waterways in the world — connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and drastically shortening shipping routes between Europe and Asia. Built with French engineering and Egyptian labor under the rule of Khedive Isma'il, the canal had been financed largely by Egyptian and European investors. Britain, which had initially opposed the canal's construction, purchased a controlling stake in the Suez Canal Company in 1875 when the financially struggling Egyptian government sold its shares. By the early twentieth century, the canal was effectively a joint Anglo-French commercial monopoly operating on Egyptian soil.

Britain's military occupation of Egypt, which began in 1882 and was formalized through various treaties, gave the British control over the canal zone and the right to station troops along its banks. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 partially withdrew British forces but retained a British garrison in the canal zone. Egyptian nationalists regarded British troops on Egyptian soil and British control of the canal as a humiliation and an infringement of sovereignty.

Gamal Abd al-Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952 following the Free Officers' coup that overthrew King Farouk. Nasser was a pan-Arab nationalist who articulated the aspirations of post-colonial Arabs across the region. He negotiated the withdrawal of British troops from the canal zone by 1956 — a genuine diplomatic achievement. His ambitions, however, extended further: the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, which would control flooding, generate electricity, and transform Egyptian agriculture.

The Dam, the Arms Deal, and Nationalization

The Aswan High Dam project required enormous financing. Nasser sought loans from the United States, Britain, and the World Bank. Initial indications were positive, but in July 1956 the United States, under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, abruptly withdrew the offer. The proximate cause was Nasser's recognition of the People's Republic of China and his refusal to join Western-sponsored anti-Soviet pacts. Nasser had been pursuing a policy of non-alignment, purchasing arms from Czechoslovakia (a Soviet bloc state) in 1955 when Western countries refused to sell weapons to Egypt on acceptable terms.

On July 26, 1956 / 1376 AH, speaking to an enormous crowd in Alexandria on the fourth anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. He had embedded the code word in his speech — whenever he said the name "de Lesseps" (the French engineer who built the canal), Egyptian officers seized the canal installations simultaneously. The crowd's reaction was ecstatic. Nasser declared that Egypt would use the canal's revenues — previously flowing to British and French shareholders — to finance the Aswan Dam.

The announcement sent shockwaves through Paris and London. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had a deep personal antipathy toward Nasser and compared him to Hitler in private correspondence, began planning military options immediately. The nationalization was technically legal under international law — Egypt compensated shareholders at market price — but Britain and France were determined to reverse it.

The Secret Conspiracy: Sèvres Protocol

Britain, France, and Israel secretly negotiated the Protocol of Sèvres (October 22-24, 1956). The plan was as follows: Israel would invade the Sinai Peninsula, advancing toward the canal. Britain and France would then issue an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to withdraw ten miles from the canal. Egypt would presumably refuse; Britain and France would then intervene militarily, ostensibly to protect the canal from the belligerents — but in reality to destroy Nasser's government and retake the canal.

Israel's motivation was the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and ongoing fedayeen raids from Egyptian-administered Gaza. France had a specific grievance: Nasser's support for the Algerian FLN. Britain's primary motivation was to protect what Eden saw as vital imperial interests and eliminate a leader he regarded as threatening British influence in the Middle East.

Military Operations

Israel's assault on the Sinai began October 29, 1956. Israeli paratroopers dropped near the Mitla Pass, and armored columns advanced across the peninsula. Egyptian forces were pushed back toward the canal within days. On October 30, Britain and France issued their prepared ultimatum. Egypt, predictably, refused.

British and French air forces began bombing Egyptian airfields on October 31. The Anglo-French naval force landed troops at Port Said on November 5-6, beginning an amphibious assault. Egyptian forces fought back, and the canal was blocked when Egypt sank ships in the waterway to impede passage. The military operation was proceeding, but the political situation was deteriorating catastrophically.

Eisenhower's Intervention: The Decisive Moment

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was furious. He had not been consulted, had not approved the operation, and regarded it as a dangerous provocation that would push Arab states toward the Soviet Union and undermine American leadership of the Western alliance. The United States was also in the middle of a presidential election campaign — the aggression of US allies against an Arab state was profoundly embarrassing.

Eisenhower moved decisively. The United States introduced a ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council, which Britain and France vetoed — their veto was then circumvented through the UN General Assembly's Emergency Special Session, which passed a ceasefire resolution by an overwhelming majority. More critically, the United States threatened Britain economically: the US Treasury was in a position to devastate the pound sterling if Britain did not comply, and the IMF loan that Britain desperately needed for its currency crisis was contingent on withdrawal.

The Soviet Union, newly confident after crushing the Hungarian uprising simultaneously, threatened to send "volunteers" to Egypt and implied nuclear threats against Britain and France. Soviet intervention was unlikely, but the psychological pressure was significant.

Within days, Britain, France, and Israel agreed to a ceasefire (November 7, 1956). Britain and France withdrew in December. Israel withdrew from Sinai in stages, completing withdrawal in March 1957 under American pressure. The Suez Canal Company was permanently nationalized and remained Egyptian. The canal was cleared and reopened.

Nasser's Triumph and Pan-Arab Nationalism

The political outcome was a stunning triumph for Nasser. Despite military defeat — Egyptian forces had been unable to stop Israel or repel the Anglo-French landing — Nasser had stared down three powers simultaneously and emerged victorious through diplomacy. His prestige across the Arab world soared to extraordinary heights. Crowds in Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and Beirut celebrated. The Egyptian national radio broadcast his speeches to audiences across the Arab world.

The Suez Crisis marked the definitive end of British and French imperial power in the Middle East. The lesson was clear: the United States, not Britain or France, was now the decisive external power in the region. Arab nationalist governments that wanted protection from Western aggression had the Soviet Union as an alternative patron. The Cold War rivalry for influence in the Middle East had reached a new intensity.

Pan-Arab nationalism reached its peak in the years following Suez. The union of Egypt and Syria (United Arab Republic, 1958-1961) was a direct product of the post-Suez enthusiasm for Arab unity. Nasser became the most popular political figure in the Arab world, and "Nasserism" — Arab socialism combined with pan-Arab unity and non-alignment — spread as an ideology from Iraq to Algeria.

Al-Azhar, Islam, and Nasser

The relationship between Nasser's government and Islamic institutions was complex. Nasser suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, imprisoning and executing its members following an assassination attempt in 1954. He subordinated Al-Azhar to state control through the 1961 law reorganizing the institution, bringing it under direct government authority and adding secular faculties.

Yet Al-Azhar's scholars generally supported Nasser on the Suez Crisis and the broader project of Arab liberation from Western imperialism. The framing of Egyptian national sovereignty and the expulsion of British forces resonated with Islamic themes of dignity, independence, and resistance to non-Muslim political domination. Nasser skillfully deployed Islamic rhetoric when useful, even as he constrained Islamist political organizations.

Legacy

The Suez Crisis of 1956 / 1376 AH was a pivotal moment in the history of the modern Muslim world. It demonstrated that collective Arab action, backed by superpower rivalry and international law, could check European imperial ambitions. It established Nasser as the dominant figure of Arab politics for a decade. It accelerated decolonization across Africa and Asia by demonstrating that former colonial powers could no longer impose their will by military force.

For Islamic political thought, Suez confirmed that Western powers would use military force to protect their strategic and economic interests in Muslim lands, that Muslim-majority states needed to build coalitions and leverage international institutions for protection, and that the era of direct European military colonialism was ending — even if other forms of political and economic influence persisted.

Sources: Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991); Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (W.W. Norton, 2000); Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (Arbor House, 1987); Peter Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 (University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (McGraw-Hill, 1969); Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (Jonathan Cape, 1978)