The World After Jerusalem's Liberation

When Saladin (Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, may Allah have mercy on him) recaptured Jerusalem on 27 Rajab 583 AH (October 2, 1187 CE), the reaction in Christian Europe was one of collective horror. Pope Gregory VIII issued the papal bull Audita tremendi, declaring the loss of the holy city a divine punishment for Christian sins and calling for a new crusade. Three of the most powerful monarchs of Europe responded: Philip II of France, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of Germany, and Richard I of England, known to history as "Coeur de Lion" — the Lionheart.

The crusade that followed (585-591 AH / 1189-1192 CE) was the largest and best-organized military expedition yet launched from Europe. It would test Saladin's state, his army, and his own resolve to the utmost. That Jerusalem remained in Muslim hands when the dust settled is one of the pivotal facts of Islamic history.

Frederick Barbarossa and the German Catastrophe

Frederick Barbarossa was the most formidable of the three crusading kings — an elderly but legendary warrior-emperor who had ruled the Holy Roman Empire for decades. He led an army variously estimated between 100,000 and 300,000 men through Anatolia, the largest force to depart for the Levant. When news of his march reached Saladin's court, his advisers urged genuine alarm.

Allah willed otherwise. On 10 Salaf 587 AH (June 10, 1190 CE), Frederick Barbarossa drowned while crossing the Saleph River in southern Anatolia. The precise circumstances remain unclear — whether he fell from his horse, attempted to swim the river, or was swept away by a current. The result was catastrophic for the Crusade: without their charismatic emperor, the German army largely disintegrated. Some turned back. Others succumbed to disease, starvation, and Seljuk attacks. A small remnant under Frederick's son continued to the Holy Land, but the German contingent that arrived was a shadow of what had set out.

Ibn al-Athir, writing in al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, noted that this event — a drowning in a river — eliminated the most dangerous threat that Islam faced in that campaign. The believer sees in such events the working of divine decree (qadar). Allah says in the Quran: "And it may be that you dislike a thing which is good for you and that you like a thing which is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know" (Surah al-Baqarah, 2:216).

Philip II and the Siege of Acre

Philip II of France and Richard I of England arrived at the siege of Acre in the spring of 590 AH / 1191 CE. The city of Akka (Acre) had been under siege by Crusader forces since 589 AH / 1189 CE — the besiegers themselves besieged by Saladin's relieving army. It was a peculiar military situation: a double siege in which neither side could achieve decisive victory.

The arrival of the French and English kings with reinforcements tilted the balance. The Muslim garrison inside Acre, commanded by Husam al-Din Abu'l-Haija, fought with extraordinary valor, but the city fell on 17 Jumada al-Ula 587 AH (July 12, 1191 CE) after prolonged negotiation. The garrison surrendered on terms: their lives were to be spared in exchange for the release of Christian prisoners and the return of a fragment of the True Cross.

Philip II, having accomplished the immediate objective, departed for France shortly thereafter — citing illness, though political concerns at home almost certainly played a role. His early departure left Richard I as the effective commander of the entire Crusader enterprise.

Richard's Massacre at Acre: A War Crime

What followed the fall of Acre is among the darkest episodes of the Crusading period. Richard I, claiming that Saladin had not fulfilled the terms of the capitulation within the agreed timeframe (the exchange of prisoners and payment were delayed by various complications), ordered the execution of approximately 2,700 Muslim prisoners — the garrison soldiers and their families — outside the walls of Acre on 28 Rajab 587 AH (August 20, 1191 CE).

Baha al-Din Yusuf ibn Rafi ibn Shaddad, who was an eyewitness serving in Saladin's army, recorded the event in his biography of Saladin known as al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya: "The Franks then brought out the Muslim prisoners for whom they were responsible — more than three thousand, bound in ropes. They fell on them all at once, killing them by sword and lance." Saladin's army, observing from a distance, was helpless to intervene.

This massacre had no justification under the laws of war as understood by Islamic jurisprudence or, indeed, under the accepted practices of medieval warfare when a garrison surrendered on terms. Saladin, by contrast, had shown remarkable mercy when he captured Jerusalem — allowing the Crusader population to ransom themselves and depart safely, in conscious imitation of Umar ibn al-Khattab's conduct when Jerusalem was first taken by the Muslims.

The March Down the Coast

After securing Acre, Richard led his army southward along the coast toward Jaffa and, ultimately, toward Jerusalem. This march (590-591 AH) was a masterpiece of medieval military logistics: the Crusader infantry marched in a tight defensive formation with the cavalry protected at the center, their right flank guarded by the sea where supply ships kept pace.

Saladin launched repeated attacks, attempting to break the Crusader formation or provoke the cavalry into a disorganized charge. The discipline of Richard's army frustrated these tactics. At the Battle of Arsuf (590 AH / September 7, 1191 CE), Saladin's harassment finally provoked the Crusader cavalry into a countercharge — but the charge was disciplined enough to win the battle without pursuing too far. Arsuf was a tactical Muslim defeat, though it did not break Saladin's army.

Ibn Shaddad's account of these months reveals Saladin's physical and mental exhaustion: he suffered from repeated illness during the campaign, drove himself relentlessly, and grieved deeply over each Muslim casualty. He was not a ruthless war machine but a man who felt the weight of responsibility for the lives under his command.

The Two Approaches to Jerusalem

Richard brought the Crusader army to within sight of Jerusalem twice — at Beit Nuba in the winter of 590-591 AH — and turned back both times. Modern historians and medieval observers alike have puzzled over this decision. Richard himself reportedly wept and covered his face with his shield when he saw Jerusalem from a hilltop, saying he was not worthy to see what he could not recover.

The strategic reasoning was sound: Jerusalem sits in the Judean hills, vulnerable to supply interruption. Richard recognized that even if he took the city by assault, he could not hold it against Saladin's relieving army without a secure supply line. Taking Jerusalem would be symbolic; holding it would be the actual challenge. His assessment proved correct — when the Crusaders later briefly held Jerusalem (through the diplomacy of Frederick II in 626 AH / 1229 CE), they held it only nine years before losing it again.

Saladin, for his part, strengthened Jerusalem's defenses, ordered the city's walls improved, and prepared for the assault that never came. Ibn Shaddad records that Saladin brought his emirs and scholars together to build collective morale when the situation seemed most desperate.

The Treaty of Jaffa

After a year of inconclusive fighting, both sides were exhausted. Richard faced political crises at home — his brother John was maneuvering against him in England. Saladin's army was fraying under the strain of continuous campaigning and the financial costs of maintaining a standing force.

Negotiations proceeded through intermediaries, including Saladin's brother al-Adil (Saphadin in the Crusader chronicles) and various diplomats. Richard and Saladin communicated extensively — exchanging gifts, engaging in chivalric gestures, debating theology and warfare. They never met in person, though Richard reportedly requested such a meeting on multiple occasions. Saladin declined, perhaps judging that personal relationship between commanders created vulnerabilities in negotiations.

The Treaty of Jaffa was concluded in Sha'ban 588 AH (September 2, 1192 CE): a three-year, three-month truce. The terms: the Crusaders retained the coastal cities from Jaffa northward; the Muslims retained Jerusalem and the interior; Christian pilgrims could visit Jerusalem safely; Muslim merchants could trade in Crusader-held coastal cities.

Jerusalem remained under Islamic sovereignty. This was the fundamental outcome of the Third Crusade.

Saladin's Death and the Islamic Legacy

Saladin returned to Damascus exhausted. He had given away almost all of his personal wealth in charity and to pay his soldiers — upon his death (589 AH / March 4, 1193 CE, just months after the treaty), his treasury contained only a small amount of gold and silver, insufficient even to pay for his burial. Ibn Shaddad and the other biographers record this with admiration — a sultan who had controlled an empire from Egypt to Iraq died essentially penniless because he had given everything to the service of Islam and Muslims.

The Third Crusade established a pattern that would define Muslim-Christian relations in the Holy Land for another century: Muslim political and military sovereignty over Jerusalem, combined with access for Christian pilgrims. This model, embodied in the Treaty of Jaffa, reflected Islamic jurisprudence's traditional framework of peaceful coexistence with People of the Book who do not bear arms against the Muslims.

Historical Sources and Transmission

The primary Islamic source for the Third Crusade is Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad's al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya — a biography of Saladin written by his personal secretary and companion who was present at nearly every event described. It is one of the most valuable eyewitness accounts of medieval warfare from any civilization.

Ibn al-Athir's al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh (The Complete History) provides a broader historical context, covering the same events from a scholar who gathered information from multiple sources in Mosul. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, Saladin's personal secretary, wrote al-Fath al-Qussi fi al-Fath al-Qudsi (The Thunderbolt of Syria on the Conquest of Jerusalem) — a highly literary account of the campaign.

From the Crusader side, the Itinerarium Regis Ricardi (Itinerary of King Richard) provides a detailed if partisan account of the campaign from the English perspective, and Ambroise's L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte offers a verse narrative by a participant. The convergence and divergence of these sources allows historians to reconstruct the events with reasonable confidence.

The Third Crusade remains a defining episode in Islamic historical memory: the moment when the greatest military power that Western Christendom could assemble failed to dislodge Islamic sovereignty over the holy cities of Palestine. The lesson drawn by Muslim scholars is that victory belongs to Allah, and that integrity, justice, and devotion to principle — exemplified by Saladin's treatment of Jerusalem's population — is ultimately more powerful than raw military force.

Sources:

Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad, al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya (tr. D.S. Richards as The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin)
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh (The Complete History)
Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, al-Fath al-Qussi fi al-Fath al-Qudsi
al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk li-Ma'rifat Duwal al-Muluk
Itinerarium Regis Ricardi (Latin chronicle)
Ambroise, L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte
Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History
Quran 2:216