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Chapter 5 of 53 min read
الزواج والمعاملات التجارية في الاختيار
Al-Mawsili's treatment of marriage (nikah) in Al-Ikhtiyar reflects the Hanafi school's distinctive positions on the guardianship requirement and the validity conditions of the marriage contract. Unlike the Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools, the Hanafi school permits an adult woman of sound mind to contract her own marriage without a guardian (wali), though it is strongly recommended that she do so with the guidance of her male relatives. This position is based on the Hanafi principle that a legally competent adult has full contractual capacity in all matters, including marriage.
However, the Hanafi school maintains that if a woman marries someone not compatible with her (without her guardian's consent), her guardian has the right to request the dissolution of the marriage by the judge. Thus the wali retains a protective role even if not a validity-condition role. Al-Mawsili presents this with its evidential basis, including the hadith 'There is no marriage without a guardian' which the Hanafi school interprets as indicating strong recommendation rather than strict validity-condition.
The conditions for a valid Hanafi marriage contract are: the offer and acceptance in the past tense (using Arabic words meaning 'I have married you' and 'I accept'), two male witnesses (or one male and two female witnesses — a Hanafi permissibility not shared by all schools), and specificity of the parties. The Hanafi school does not accept conditional marriages or marriages for a specified term (mut'ah), the latter being unanimously prohibited by all Sunni schools.
The mahr (dower) in the Hanafi school has a minimum value of ten dirhams — a distinctive Hanafi ruling not shared by other schools. Al-Mawsili grounds this in certain narrated opinions and the logic that a mahr below this threshold lacks the dignity befitting the marriage contract. If a mahr less than ten dirhams is agreed, the wife is entitled to ten dirhams as mahr al-mithl (customary dower) replaces the stipulated amount.
In commercial transactions (mu'amalat), the Hanafi school is known for its extensive use of istihsan (juristic preference) — departing from strict qiyas when its application would produce results contrary to the established principles of Islamic law or to common welfare. Al-Mawsili illustrates this with the salam contract (forward sale), which logically should be prohibited under the rule against selling what one does not own, but which is permitted as an istihsan based on the clear prophetic permission and the community's practical need for such arrangements.
Ijarah (rental/lease) is treated comprehensively. The Hanafi school requires that the subject of rental be specified, the rental period be determined, and the rent be known. Leasing land for agriculture is permitted provided the terms are clear. Leasing one's own labor is permitted, and the Hanafi school developed elaborate rules for labor contracts (ijarah 'ala al-a'mal) that formed the basis of classical Islamic employment law.
Al-Mawsili concludes his commercial transactions section by noting that the spirit of Islamic commerce is captured in the prophetic description of the trustworthy Muslim merchant: he earns the rank of the righteous — because every transaction conducted in honesty and adherence to the Shariah is itself an act of worship. Commerce is not merely a worldly activity but a domain in which the Muslim's moral character is tested and displayed.