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Chapter 2 of 63 min read
وجود الله ووحدانيته
The student poses what he acknowledges as the most fundamental question in theology: how do we know with certainty that Allah exists? He notes that this is not a question he doubts personally, having been raised in the Islamic tradition, but he wishes to understand the rational proof so that he can respond to those who raise the question in debate or doubt. Abu Hanifa's response begins with the observable world: everything the student sees around him, from the smallest creature to the largest mountain, from the structure of the human body to the movement of the stars, exhibits design, order, and purpose. These characteristics are not accidental features of an uncaused universe but demand an explanation in terms of a designer, orderer, and purposer who is external to and prior to the things themselves.
Abu Hanifa develops this argument in terms of the distinction between the originated (muhdath) and the eternal (qadim). Everything we observe in the world is originated: it comes into existence after not having existed, undergoes change, and will cease in its current form. The existence of originated things requires a cause, since nothing brings itself into existence. If we trace the chain of causes back, we must arrive either at an infinite regression, which would mean that nothing was ever caused and thus nothing exists (clearly false, since things do exist), or at a first cause that is itself uncaused, eternal, and self-subsistent. This first cause is what all people of sound understanding call Allah: the One whose existence is necessary in Himself, who has no beginning and will have no end, who is not a created thing and not a part of creation.
The student then raises the possibility of multiple gods: could there not be two eternal, necessary beings who share the role of first cause? Abu Hanifa's response draws on what later became the classical argument for divine unity from the concept of mutual limitation. If there were two beings each claiming necessary existence and absolute power, they would necessarily limit each other: what one wills, the other might not will, and conflict between two absolute wills would result in the inability of either to fully realize its will. But the world we observe exhibits coherent order, not the chaos that would result from two conflicting omnipotent wills. The Quran makes this argument explicitly: 'If there were in them (the heavens and the earth) gods besides Allah, they would both have been corrupted' (21:22). Coherent creation testifies to a single Creator.
The dialogue also addresses the attributes implied by the existence of a single Creator. He must be Living (Hayy), since the source of life in created beings must itself possess life in the highest sense. He must be Knowing ('Alim), since the precise order of the creation cannot be explained by blind force. He must be Powerful (Qadir), since everything in existence came about through His act. He must be Willing (Murid), since the specific form creation took among infinite possibilities requires a choosing will. These attributes are not separate from the divine essence but are real descriptions of what Allah is, affirmed by reason and confirmed by revelation. Abu Hanifa's insistence on the rational demonstrability of divine unity and attributes laid the foundation for the Maturidi theological school that developed in his wake.