Qadar, Human Responsibility, and Divine Justice

The student raises what he considers the most difficult theological question he has encountered: if Allah has decreed everything that will happen from before creation, how can human beings be genuinely responsible for their actions? He poses this as a dilemma: either human beings have real freedom of choice, in which case they are responsible for their choices, or Allah has predetermined everything, in which case human beings are merely executing a pre-written script and cannot reasonably be held accountable for what they could not have chosen otherwise. The student notes that the Quran seems to affirm both divine decree and human responsibility without resolving the apparent tension, and he asks Abu Hanifa to explain how this is possible.

Abu Hanifa begins his response by rejecting the two extremes that have divided theologians on this question. The Qadariyyah, who deny divine foreknowledge and decree in order to preserve human freedom, have contradicted the Quran and Sunnah, which explicitly affirm that Allah knows all things and that nothing occurs outside His will and decree. The Jabriyyah, who hold that humans have no real agency and are compelled in all their actions, have also contradicted the Quran, which commands, prohibits, praises, and blames human beings in terms that presuppose genuine moral agency. Both positions represent a failure of theological reasoning, solving one part of the problem by eliminating the other. The correct position affirms both divine decree and human agency without subordinating either to the other.

The key concept Abu Hanifa introduces is the distinction between the types of divine will and human acquisition (kasb). Allah wills, decrees, and creates all things, including human actions. Human beings, however, possess a real capacity (istita'ah) and a real choice, which they exercise within the scope of what Allah has decreed. The human being's choice is genuine: it originates from his own will and capacity, and it is this origination that grounds moral responsibility. At the same time, the human will and capacity are themselves created by Allah and exist within His comprehensive decree. This is not a contradiction but a recognition that two different levels of causation operate simultaneously: divine creation at the cosmic level and human agency at the creaturely level. The student asks: if Allah created my act of sin, why am I punished for it? Abu Hanifa responds that Allah created the capacity and the choice; the human being chose wrongly with that capacity and that choice, and moral accountability follows from the choice, not from the creation of the capacity.

The dialogue concludes with Abu Hanifa's affirmation that divine justice (adl) is fully compatible with divine decree. Allah does not wrong anyone: He created human beings with the capacity to obey and provided them with prophets, books, and clear guidance. The human being who disobeys does so through his own genuine choice, and punishment follows justly from that choice. The human being who obeys does so through his own choice aided by Allah's grace (tawfiq), and reward follows from that choice combined with Allah's mercy. The student accepts this framework not as a complete solution to every philosophical puzzle but as the position that best honors all of the Quran's teachings simultaneously, neither sacrificing divine sovereignty to preserve human freedom nor sacrificing human moral reality to preserve divine omnipotence. Abu Hanifa's treatment of qadar became foundational for the Maturidi school's nuanced engagement with this perennial theological question.