Part 100

Those who make the exception a necessity base their claim on two principles. The first is that one’s Iman concerns only the state of his Iman when he dies. For a man

* The clause ana mu’min, in sha’a Allah, J am a believer, if Allah wills, is a theological issue and came to be known as istithna’, exception in Iman. Some religious scholars add the conditional clause in sha’a Allah to the affirmative statement "I am a believer," and some do not.

is considered a believer or an unbeliever according to his state of faith or unbelief upon dying, whereas his state before that is of no importance. They say that if Iman is followed by unbelief, then the person who dies in a state of unbelief is considered an unbeliever. This is like someone who spoils his prayer before he finishes it or breaks his fast before sunset. Such a man is indeed considered an unbeliever because of Allah’s knowledge of the state in which he will die. This was the argument employed by many later thinkers of the Kullabite sect, as well as others who supported the view that came to be widely ascribed to Orthodox Muslims and people of the hadith. According to this view, one must add the clause, “if Allah wills,” whenever stating that one is a believer. At the same time, there is no variation or gradation in belief from one person to the next, and this clause is used not because one doubts his present faith, but rather because he is not certain whether he will continue to believe in the future. A further claim was added to these views, namely that the love of Allah, His approval, disapproval, and His wrath exists throughout all eternity. But here the question arises as to whether such things are to be identified with the [divine] will, or with other [divine] attributes? Two positions have been taken on this question. Most earlier thinkers held that divine approval, disapproval, wrath, and so on are attributes not to be identified with divine will. Similarly, hearing and sight are not to be identified with knowledge, nor are friendship and enmity, all of which are eternally preexisting attributes in the view of Abu Muhammad ‘Abd Allah Ibn Sa‘id Ibn Kullab and those scholastic theologians who followed in his footsteps, as well as followers of the views of the Hanbalites, Shafi‘ites, Malikites, and others.

Such people hold that throughout all eternity Allah loves someone who is an unbeliever, if it becomes known that this person will eventually die a believer. Allah loves the Companions of the Prophet, for example, even though they worshiped idols for a period of time; conversely, Allah abhors Iblis throughout all eternity, even from the time before he became an unbeliever. This position arises out of one of the two views taken on the question above. For Allah’s pleasure and displeasure can be traced back to His will, which in tun corresponds to divine knowledge. What this means is that Allah continues to desire to reward such people after they have embraced belief, and to punish Iblis after. his having become an unbeliever. And this is correct. For Allah wills to create everything that He already knows He will create. And based on the views of those who affirm this, there are other attributes. It has also been said that His love pursues the one whom

He wills to reward, for everyone whom He wills to establish, He loves, and everyone whom He wills to punish, He abhors. And this follows upon knowledge. According to those who hold this view, once someone has been the object of Allah’s wrath, he will never enjoy His favor; nor does Allah begin to rejoice ina servant’s repentance after He restores him to grace, since He rejoices in it throughout all eternity. His [Allah’s] rejoicing arises cither out of [His] will or out of [His] approval. And what this means is that Allah always wills to establish such a person [in belief]. Similarly, Allah’s wrath against someone does not begin on the Day of Resurrection without any continuity with what went before, Rather, His wrath exists for all eternity, either in the sense of willing it, or in some other sense.

Hence, they claim that if Allah knows that a particular person will die an unbeliever, then He wills this person’s punishment for all eternity. Hence, whatever faith this person had is devoid of all benefit; in fact, it may as well not exist. For such a person was not [truly] a believer to begin with. Conversely, if it becomes known that someone will die a believer, then He [Allah] wills to establish this person [in belief] for all eternity, and whatever unbelief he has been guilty of may as well not exist, since according to this view, such a person was never [truly] an unbeliever to begin with. Thus, such people include the phrase, “if Allah wills,” whenever stating that anyone is a believer. In fact some of them, for example, Abu Mansir al-Maturidi, add this clause even when stating that someone is an unbeliever. Hence, they apply the same practice in either case. However, the majority of the leading authorities on Islam do not add the exception when stating that someone is an unbeliever. In fact, this practice is a heretical one that has never been reported by any of the pious ancestors. Nevertheless, it is considered to be a necessity [by those who practice it].

There are also some within this group who make a distinction between the two situations, saying that we make the exception with respect to belief out of our desire that Allah may establish us in belief until the day we die, whereas unbelief is something no one would desire. However, if one’s stating that he is a believer is tantamount to his saying that he will enter Paradise, then one might say of the unbeliever that he is an unbeliever but not that he will enter Hellfire, unless one meant to say that such a person was going to die an unbeliever. Hence, one might state unequivocally that someone was in a condition of unbelief, albeit with the acknowledgment that he might become a believer. Likewise in the case of the believer, whether he is speaking of himself or of someone else, if he were to say

of a Jew or a Christian, “he is an unbeliever,” then he would need to add, “if Allah wills,” as long he did not know whether this person would die an unbeliever. And in the view under discussion, no one knows whether anyone else is a believer unless he also knows that he will die in a state of unbelief. This view has been espoused by many scholastic theologians who were disciples of Ibn Kullab; moreover, it has also found support among a good number of the followers of the founders of the four Orthodox schools of Islam [Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi‘l, Malik Ibn Anas, and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal]. Nevertheless, it is not a position that was ever adopted by any of the pious ancestors, the four authorities mentioned above, or anyone else. Nor did any of the pious ancestors who made the exception [with regard to belief] argue for it, including Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and his predecessors.

EXCESSIVE USE OF EXCEPTION

The principle upon which this practice was based was repudiated by a group of leading Muslim thinkers who had been accustomed to making the exception with respect to belief in imitation of the pious ancestors. Thinkers from Syria were particularly hard on the Murji?ites. This happened during the time when [the city of] ‘Asqalan was [still] inhabited, being one of the choicest of all Muslim seaports. Muhammad Ibn Yisuf al-Faryani,’ a disciple of al-Thawri, was stationed there. And for this reason it had a frontier fortress built for the sake of Allah. At that time, people used to make the exception when speaking of someone as a believer, thereby following the example of the pious ancestors. They also made the exception whenever someone spoke of righteous works [he intended to perform]. This may be seen in the example of someone who says, “I have prayed, if Allah wills,” meaning that if Allah wills, his prayer will be accepted. In this practice situation one may also see the influence of the pious ancestors. After that some took the practice a step further, and began making the exception with respect to everything. One might say, for example, that this is my robe, if Allah wills, or that this is a rope, if Allah wills. And if someone objected, saying that these are matters about which there is not any doubt, he would reply that it is true, there is no doubt about it. However, if Allah wishes to change these things, He could do so. Hence, by using the clause, “if Allah wills,” they are expressing the possibility that

2 Al-Faryani, Muhammad Ibn Yiisuf (2-212 A.H.), was a close associate of al-Thawri and was against the Murji’ites. [Kitab al-Iman MZ, p. 372.]

something might change in the future, even if at the present time it is in a condition concerning which there was no doubt. Thus, the only facts one would not be required to add the clause, “if Allah wills,” are those not subject to change. This is similar to the view of those who make the exception with Tespect to belief, namely, that [true] belief is that which Allah knows will not change, being the same condition in which its possessor will ultimately die.