Part 92

THE CONCEPT OF IMAN AND RELATED ISSUES 381

superficial meaning. Rather, he would interpret it on the basis of the meanings he deduced, not only from what the Qur’an does say, but also from what it does not say. Hence, the meaning would become apparent {in part] from the Qur’an’s silence on a given matter, not because of the Qur?an’s indication that it is the surface meaning. Hence, they did not hold to the straightforward meanings of the words themselves, but rather to the meanings to which these words point. The foundation on which they based all this is ignorance of the texts that provide evidence of restrictions that may apply to the Quranic passage at hand. However, everything the Qur’an reveals and manifests is truth, as opposed to some other meaning that may appear correct to someone although it does not reflect what is in the Qur’4n itself. This includes inferences drawn by heretical sects, such as the Murji’ites, the Jahmites, the Kharijites, and the Shi‘ites.

THE VIEWS OF THE MURUPITES, THE KULLABITES AND THE KARRAMITES ON IMAN AND THE RESPONSE TO THEM

Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] said that whoever claims that Iman is a verbal testimony of belief may be asked what he says about knowledge. Does one need knowledge with verbal testimony in order to be a believer? And does one need to believe in {affirm] what he knows in order to be a believer? If he claims that one need knowledge in addition to verbal testimony in order to be a believer, this means that he claims that Iman consists of two components. And if he holds that one needs. verbal testimony, acceptance, and knowledge in order to be a believer, he is claiming that Iman consists of three components. However, if he claims that one needs neither knowledge nor tasdiq in order to be a believer, he is absolutely wrong. For the absence of knowledge, tasdiq, and works—all these combined—signals sin and unbelief.

The author says that Ahmad, Abu Thawr, and other Muslim leaders knew the origin of the Murji?ites’ claim that Iman is a single entity, such that it is untrue to say that part of it may leave while the other part stays in one’s heart. For Iman can only be one thing [that is, it cannot consist of two or three parts]. Therefore, in order to avoid the partition of Iman, the Jahmites said that Iman is a single thing in the heart, while the Karramites said that Iman is a single thing on the tongue.

However, Muslim jurists have provided evidence that refutes the Murjiites’ claim. For example, Abu Thawr refuted the claim of Murji’ite jurists by taking as evidence the unanimous agreement that Iman is tasdiq and works, despite the fact that he did not receive the statements of their representatives or the opinion of the Jahmites. Their opinion had not yet reached the level of their disagreement. And Ahmad mentioned that knowledge and tasdiq must accompany verbal testimony. Moreover, he [Ahmad] said that whoever denies the necessity of knowledge and tasdiq has uttered an unacceptable view, the falsity of which may clearly be seen when examined against the teachings of Islam. For this reason no one held this view before the establishment of the Karramite sect, even though this sect does not deny the necessity of knowledge and tasdiq. Rather, they simply hold that such things do not enter into the definition of belief, lest belief be fragmented or multiplied. For they do not believe it is possible for someone to lose part of his belief while retaining part of it, for this requires that the same person have both belief and unbelief in his heart. Hence, they unanimously hold this view, which has been mentioned by al-Ash‘ari and others. .

This is a fallacious argument, to which many have fallen prey, despite their being sincere Muslims who were individuals of understanding, devotion, reverence, and belief. On account of this, a number of jurists, who were known by the Islamic community to be prudent, pious individuals adopted the Murji”ites’ views. For this reason, none of the pious aftcestors declared any of these people to be unbelievers; instead, they considered their views to be an innovation involving certain terminology and behaviors, but not a heresy revolving around essential doctrines. For a large part of the dispute over such questions is merely semantic, revolving around the proper term by which to refer to a given entity. But whatever term is consistent with the Qur’dn and the Sunnah is the most appropriate and correct one. For no one has the right to espouse a view that is in conflict with what Allah and His Messenger said, especially when such views were used as pretexts to support the heretical doctrines of scholastic theologians who held the Murji’ites’ beliefs, or to justify immoral behavior. In this way, a minor error in terminology has become a cause for a much greater error in both doctrine and practice. For this reason, so much criticism has been leveled against the Murji”ites that Ibrahim alNakh‘i once said that the dissension and strife introduced by the Murji’ite sect posed a greater threat to the Islamic community than that aroused by the

THE CONCEPT OF IMAN AND RELATED ISSUES 383

Azariqites.”” And according to al-Zuhri, there has never arisen a heresy more harmful to Islam and its adherents than that of the Murji’ites. As for al-Awza‘“, he stated that Yahya Ibn Abi Kathir’! and Qatadah used to say that they could think of no caprice or fancy that would be a greater cause to fear for the Islamic community than the Murji?ites’ teachings. Speaking also of the Murji’ite sect, Sharik al-Qadi said that they are the most odious of all people. As if the Rafidites” were not hateful enough, the Murji?ites, who told lies against Allah, were worse. And Sufyan al-Thawri said that the Murji’ites have left Islam more flimsy than Sabri’s robe. As for Qatddah, he notes that the Murji?ite sect arose after the insurrection incited by Ibn al-Ash‘ath’s band of followers.

Once Maymiin Ibn Muhran was asked about the views held by the Murji?ites, to which he replied that he would not even deign to speak of them. Once Sa‘id Ibn Jubayr said to Dharr al-Hamadhani, “Are you not ashamed [to embrace] an opinion that is beneath you?” And Ayyib al-Sikhtiyani once stated that the religion of the Murji’ites was beneath his dignity. The first person ever to voice the Murji?ites’ views was a man of Madinah, from the tribe of Bani Hashim, by the name of al-Hassan. According to Zadhan,” he came to see al-Hassan Ibn Muhammad” and said: “What is this book that you have written?” [Since he was the one who had recorded the Murji’ites’ teachings.] He replied: “Oh, Abu ‘Umar, I wish I had died before writing this book and letting it see the light of day! For an error concerning the term ‘belief’ is not like an error concerning some other word, such as the name of a transmitter of prophetic traditions. After all, the meaning of the terms ‘belief,’ Islam, ‘unbelief,’ and ‘hypocrisy’ have a bearing on judgments pertaining both to this life and the life to come.”

2 Yahya Ibn Abi Kathir (?-129 A.H.) was a leading authority on hadith. [Kitab al-Iman MZ, p.

2 The Rafidite sect is an extremist Shi‘ite subsect.

2 Zadhan, Abu ‘Amr al-Kindi (2-82 A. H.), was a trustworthy scholar of hadith but transmitted very few hadiths. [Kitab al-Iman MZ, p. 346.]

> |-Hassan Ibn Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyyah (2-101 A.H.) was a pious man who did not take a position concerning the affairs of Caliph “Uthman, Caliph ‘Ali, Talhah, and al-Zubayr: however, the matter should be left in a state of irja” adjournment, for Allah to decide on. [Kitab al-Iman MZ, p. 346.)

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal made a distinction between the knowledge that resides in the heart and the tasdiq that resides in the heart. For the verbal testimony uttered by the tongue is tasdiq. He thus mentioned three things [i.e., inward knowledge, inward belief, and outward testimony], whereas this includes only two. That is, one may distinguish between tagdiq in one’s heart and knowledge in one’s heart, which is consistent with the views of Ibn Kullab, al-Qilanisi, al-Ash‘ari, and his followers, since they distinguished between knowledge of the heart and tasdiq of the heart. Tasdiq is the heart’s utterance. And utterance of the heart, according to them, is not knowledge but rather another type [of entity]. Therefore Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] asked: “Does [belief] require both knowledge and verbal testimony? Does it require that one believe that which he has come to know? For if one claims that it requires both knowledge and verbal testimony, then he is claiming that belief consists of two things. And if one says that it requires that one both confess and believe in what he has come to know, then belief consists of three things. But if one denies [that it requires any of these things], saying: ‘It requires neither knowledge nor tasdiq,’ then he has committed a grave error. For I can hardly imagine anyone who would deny the necessity of both knowledge and tasdiq.”

There are those who say that belief is verbal testimony, while testimony with the tongue implies that the tongue is likewise affirming the truth of what it confesses. The Murji?ites were in agreement that verbal testimony with the tongue implied such assent, knowing that what it meant is that tasdiq and knowledge in one’s heart go along with an outward acknowledgment with the tongue. However, one might say that what is meant is assent of the heart, both in one’s heart and with one’s tongue, along with knowledge and verbal testimony. As for the term “testimony,” it refers to commitment, not mere assent of the truth of something. Allah says: “And [remember] when Allah took the Covenant of the Prophets, “Take what ever I gave you from the Book and Wisdom, and afterwards there will come to you a Messenger [Muhammad] confirming what is with you; you must believe in him and help him.’ Allah says: ‘Do you agree [to it] and will you take up my Covenant?’ They said: ‘We agree.’ He says: ‘Then bear witness; and | am with you among the witnesses” (3:81). For the covenant was made with them based on the assumption that they believed in it and supported it, for this is what they were commanded to do. But this verbal testimony is not the same as tasdiq, for Allah has made no declaration of truth to them for them to believe or affirm. Rather, He charges them with the obligation to believe in and support His