Chapter 33 of 108 8 min read

Part 33

الجزء الثالث والثلاثون

4. There are those who say that pre-Islamic speakers of Arabic did not transmit the information that a certain utterance meant such and such. Instead, they transmitted the uttered speech of the Arabs and their interpretation of it. Even if they transmitted a term from the Arabs that revealed that Iman is tasdiq, assent, this is no more significant than all Muslims having transmitted the Qur’an from the Prophet (pbuh). And if, in spite of this, some Muslims assumed that the Prophet intended certain meanings that he did not, then how much more likely would it be for such a thing to happen with respect to various words transmitted from the speech of [pre-Islamic] Arabs?

5. One can argue that in this case the transmitters were very few, to the extent that we should not rely on their transmission. And was this kind of successive transmission available to all Arabs before the revelation of the Qur’an to indicate that the Arabs did not recognize any meaning for Iman other than tasdiq, assent?

If one argues that by this token the author refutes the knowledge of language before the revelation of the Qur?4n, he {the author] remarks: “There is no need to know the language that was spoken before the revelation of the Qur’an, for it was revealed in Arabic to the Arabs in the dialect of Quraysh, and those who were addressed by it were the Arabs.” The Companions of the Prophet understood its meanings and in turn transmitted its words and meanings to their followers until it reached us. Therefore, there is no need for us to transmit that language [the language spoken before the revelation of the Qur’an] in a way other than that in which the Qur’an was transmitted, both in utterance and meaning. Since both the words and the meaning of the Qur’an were transmitted in their [the Arabs] language, we know that in their language the words: sama’, sky; ard, earth; layl,

THE ASH‘ARITES’ AND OTHER SECTS’ OPINIONS 137

night; nahar, day, shams, sun; qamar, moon; and others have the same meaning they have in the Qur’an. Otherwise, transmitting each of these words [without referring to the Quran] would be a very difficult job. With respect to any and all words, it would be difficult to ascertain, with certainty, that all Arabs meant to convey a particular meaning via a particular word. However, knowledge of the meanings contained in the Qur’an does not require that we ascertain such a thing. The reason for this is that the Companions of the Prophet reported these meanings along with the words that conveyed them. And supposing, for example, that a community of people heard something said in a language other than Arabic, and they then translated this utterance for us, there would then be no need for us to be familiar with their original language.

6. The Ash‘arites did not cite a single piece of evidence from the speech of the Arabs that supported their claim. That is, instead of citing evidence from the Qur’4n, they referred to people who said that this man believes in intercession, and that man believes in Paradise and Hell; and this man believes in torment of the grave, and that man does not believe in that. It is well known that these are not the utterances of the Arabs before the revelation of the Quran, but rather of Arabs who came after the Companions of the Prophet (pbuh) and who were present at the time when the heretics falsified the facts concerning intercession and the torment of the grave. Those who said so did not mean mere belief of the heart, but also the assent of the heart and the tongue. For the belief of the heart only becomes known through the tongue.

7. Whoever says: Knowledge means tasdiq, does not mean acceptance of what he hopes and fears without having true hope and fear. But he believes in torment of the grave and fears it. He also believes in intercession and hopes for it. On the other hand, if he believes in torment of the grave but has no fear of it in his heart, he is not called a believer in it. Similarly, he is not called a believer in Paradise and Hell unless he hopes to enter Paradise and fears Hell. Likewise, Iblis, the devil, is not called a believer in Allah even if he believes in the existence of Allah and His Oneness. Also, Pharaoh, to whom Allah sent Moses in order to guide him to the right path, is not called a believer although he has knowledge that Allah sent Moses as a Prophet and that He has sent the revelation. The Jews do not believe in the Qur’an or the Messenger even though they know that they are true just as they

know their own children. There is absolutely nothing in the speech of the Arabs about someone who is aware of a thing he fears and hopes for and ought to love and glorify, but, at the same time, he does not like it or glorify it or aspire to it; rather he denies it and falsifies it with his own tongue. Even if he believed in it with his heart and falsifies it with his tongue, they would say: he is a musaddiq, confirmer of belief: However, if he believes in it and acts contrary to that belief, they would not say: he believes in it. This again confirms that there is not one single piece of evidence in the speech of the Arabs to support their claim. Allah says: “. . . But you will never believe us . . .” (12:17), which gives no indication that the word musaddig is synonymous with the word “believer.” For if the meaning is valid in using either of two words, it does not mean that one word is synonymous with the other.

With respect to the claim that “they know of no other sort of ‘belief’ in the Arabic language,” one may ask: On what basis can one make such a sweeping negation? This is merely a claim made in ignorance.

. It is stated that if we assume that the linguistic meaning of Iman is tasdiq,

assent, then of course it does not thereby mean the assent of anything and everything without exception. Rather, it refers to belief in an assent of the truths reported by the speech of the Legislator [the Prophet, pbuh]. Therefore, the meaning of Iman, when used by the Prophet, will be narrower and more specific than it would be in the Arabic language in general. As we know, a specific usage of a word will involve restrictions and qualifications that are not found when a word is used in a more general

* According to the editors of the different editions of Kitab al-Iman, there is a blank here in the original Indian edition, upon which the editors based the present volume, as well as in all other editions we have consulted (especially MI.2, MZ, and MKH).

5 Abu al-Bayan al-Shaykh, al-Qurayshi (2-551 A.H.), was the head of the al-Bayaniyyah Sifi group in Damascus. [Kitab al-Iman MZ, p. 130 and al-Zirikli, vol. 8, p. 320.)

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11. The Qur’an does not mention an undefined, absolute Iman but rather remarks that the word Iman occurs as either conditioned, or absolute and defined. An illustration of the conditioned Iman is indicated in Allah’s saying: “. .. They believe in the unseen . . .” (2:3); and His saying: “But none believed in Moses except the offspring of his people . . .” (10:83); and of the absolute Iman in His saying: “For, believers are those who, when Allah is mentioned, feel a tremor in their hearts . . .” (8:2); and “Only those are believers who have believed in Allah and His Messenger, and have never since doubted, but have striven with their belongings and their lives in the Cause of Allah. Such are the sincere ones” (49:15); and “But no, by your Lord, they can have no belief until they make you a judge in all disputes between them and find in themselves no resistance against your decisions, and accept them with full submission” (4:65), as well as other similar verses. Thus, every instance of absolute Iman in the Qur’an shows that man cannot be a believer unless he proves it by works accompanied by assent. Allah shows in the Quran that Iman requires works with tasdiq, assent. A similar case has been made with regard to the words “prayer,” “zakah,” “fasting,” and “pilgrimage” (i.e., they must be accompanied with works and assent).

Someone might say: These words remain as they are, however, their referents have come to include words that they did not include before, even though the words

themselves are unchanged. This is the position taken by Judge Abu Ya‘la and others. And to this one may reply that if this claim is correct, then could not the same be said concerning the word Iman? This question has been addressed to some who hold the above view, but it has not been answered satisfactorily, and it has been claimed that this matter has not been treated in the Qur’an, which is not the case. In fact, both the Qur’an and the Sunnah are replete with references that indicate that a person cannot justly be described as a believer unless his Iman includes both works and assent. Moreover, this type of reference in the Qur’an is found much more frequently than those referring to prayer and the giving of zakah. For these latter terms are only explained in the Sunnah, whereas the meaning of the word Iman is explained in both the Qur’an and the Sunnah and was agreed upon unanimously by the pious ancestors.