Part 57

With regard to the Muslims, he occupied a prominent position.361 The conquest of Edessa raised Imad ad-Deen in status in the eyes of the Seljuk Sultan Mas'ood and the Abbasid caliph alMuqtafi li Amrillah, who bestowed on him a number of titles that he had earned, such as al-Ameer al-Muzaffar (the Victorious Leader), Rukn al-Islam (the Pillar of Islam), 'Umdat as-Saldteen (the Foremost among the Sultans), Za'eem Juyoosh al-Muslimeen (Commander of the Muslim Armies), Malik al- 'Umara' (the King of the Emirs) and Ameer al- 'Iraqayn wash-Sham (Emir of the Two Iraqs and Greater Syria).362 The victory made Imad ad-Deen Zangi the foremost defender of the faith and mujahid, who was striving to make the word of Allah supreme. In Muslim gatherings there was a great deal of talk centred on his character, which shows us the extent of the appreciation and admiration he garnered after achieving this great victory. This victory paved the way for Imad ad-Deen Zangi to complete the conquest of neighbouring fortresses and impose his authority completely on the possessions of his enemies in the area. The conquest of Edessa played a major role in saving the emirate of Imad adDeen Zangi from the danger of continual Crusader raids, and after living in fear its inhabitants found security.363 This, in sha' Allah, was a sign of glad tidings (of the reward of paradise for him). John LaMonte's opinion of 'Imad ad-Deen John L. LaMonte was regarded as one of the most prominent American historians during the first half of the last century. He wrote several books about the Crusades, most notably his comprehensive study of feudalism in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. But he wrote another study entitled "Crusade and Jihad"364. In this study, LaMonte focused on refuting the idea of Jihad among Muslims at that time, and depicted the actions of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad at that time as being motivated solely by political and economic factors. He asserts that Imad ad-Deen Zangi cannot be regarded in any way as a hero of Jihad, and that he had wanted to take back Edessa for a long time, as Kamal ad-Deen ibn al-'Adeem says, but he did not start to think seriously about it until a later stage, after he was urged to do so by the Emir of Harran, Jamal ad-Deen Abul-Ma'ali Fadl-Allah ibn Mahan, who explained to him how easy it would be to occupy the city.365 LaMonte explains: It seems that he himself regarded occupying Edessa as contrary to his policies and something that he did on the basis of the incitement of others.366 He also states: Zangi's capture of Hama and Aleppo, and his wars against the Artuqids, were more important to him than fighting the Christians, and he did not object to forming an alliance with the Latins if he thought it was in his interest.367 It is possible to refute these views by noting the following points: The fact that Imad ad-Deen Zangi delayed attacking Edessa does not diminish his role in Jihad at all, especially since he thought that he should use up the energy of this Crusader principality through his conflicts and attacks against its fortifications, after which he would go and attack the principality itself once he had acquired an understanding of its defences and found out its weak points as well as its strong points. On the other hand, it is natural to suppose that the advice of the Emir of Harran to Zangi to capture Edessa could not have changed the situation at all if Zangi had not planned previously for that. It is difficult to imagine the fall of that principality happening as depicted by LaMonte; rather it is most likely that it had been part of Zangi's plan for a long time. As for the reason why Zangi did not capture it earlier, this was because during the early stages of his rule he did not want to exhaust his military forces in premature confrontations with the Crusaders when there was no guarantee of the outcome. Hence it is possible to regard the timing of Edessa's capture — based on what is explained in the Latin, Syriac and Arabic sources — as one of the greatest proofs of Zangi's political brilliance. It seems that LaMonte's claim that the fall of Edessa was not part of the policy of 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi is a claim that has no historical support. It is well known that Zangi was a member of Mawdood's army, or as Ibn alAtheer put it, "He was present with him during his wars."368 No doubt Zangi understood the importance of capturing Edessa, and indeed this dream had been entrenched in his mind for a long time, and one would imagine that he wanted to succeed where Mawdood had failed before him. He thought that capturing Edessa was essential on the basis that it was the closest Crusader target to Mosul; achieving this goal would also make communication with northern Syria easier, especially given his strong belief in the importance of uniting the Muslims.369 John LaMonte's suggestion that Zangi could have formed an alliance with the Latin rulers to serve his political interests is a suggestion which confirms the political acumen of 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi.