Part 61

In the first months of 536 AH, the Crusaders launched a swift attack against some Muslim sites west of Aleppo, and when they dispersed, Suwar sent a force of Turkmens, led by his son 4Alam adDeen, who raided Crusader sites and reached as far as the walls of Antioch, then returned carrying a large amount of plunder and booty.396 A short while later, Lujat at-Turki raided some Crusader territories in the north: killing, capturing prisoners and seizing booty. It was said that the number of slain was seven hundred.397 In Ramadan of the same year, Suwar attacked a Crusader camp at Jisr al-Hadeed ('Iron Bridge'), northeast of Antioch, after crossing the Orontes river with his troops towards the enemy's gathering. He managed to kill most of the troops in the camp, and took the rest captive.398 The following year, the regent of Antioch went out and raided the valley of Baza'ah, near Aleppo, and was confronted by Suwar, who forced him to withdraw. Joscelin managed to take this opportunity to attack the Muslim camps on the banks of the Euphrates, and managed to capture nine hundred men. The two sides then decided to form a truce in which the regent of Antioch played no part. Hence the fighting continued between this county and the forces of Aleppo. When in Jumada I 538 AH a large group of merchants went out from Antioch, guarded by a number of knights and carrying a lot of wealth and goods on their way to one of the neighbouring Crusader areas, the Muslims launched a sudden attack and took them by surprise, and they managed to eliminate all the troops who had come out to protect them. They took as booty all the valuable goods that this party had been carrying.399 At the end of Dhul-Qa'dah in the same year, a group of Aleppan horsemen attacked a group of Crusader knights who had come out from Basuta and destroyed them, and they captured the ruler of Basuta, whom Suwar detained in Aleppo400 Hence we see some of the methods that Zangi used in order to achieve his twin aims of forming an Islamic front and striking the Crusaders. By examining the relationship that 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi had with the Islamic forces such as the emirates of different cities and local emirates in Mesopotamia and Syria, and the Kurdish and Turkmen tribes, we can clearly see the extent of his political acumen and his brilliance in military planning in his relationships in war and peace with those forces located in the region. From an official standpoint, he received a letter from the Seljuk Sultan Mahmood ibn Muhammad ibn Malikshah in 522 AH confirming his legitimate authority in Mosul, Mesopotamia and Syria, and this position was confirmed again in the next few years. Nonetheless, this was not sufficient to prove his actual authority during that period, when many emirs were able to impose their authority on countless numbers of cities and regions, were largely independent of the Seljuk state, and benefited from a number of personal, political, geographical, economic and human factors. So it was essential for Zangi to subjugate the various powers concentrated in that region and to choose an offensive strategy from the outset. There were dangers surrounding such a strategy: the first of which was the possibility that a defensive alliance might be formed among the local emirs which could later on be turned into an offensive alliance, as happened in the case of the Artuqids; secondly, there was nothing to fall back on in the event of being defeated by or retreating before the local emirs who surrounded him on all sides. He paid no heed to these dangers, however, and started attacking the local emirs from the outset, prompted by his own ambition and courage, and his confidence that he had sincere support from a populace that loved him for his stance towards the Crusaders even before he was appointed as governor of Mosul. He was also helped by the sultan's letter of authority referred to above, which gave him authority to rule Mosul, Mesopotamia and Syria, for this implied that Zangi would have free rein to engage in fighting with local political entities and sweep them aside, using any means he saw fit to achieve this goal.401 More important than all this was Imad ad-Deen Zangi's political acumen, military brilliance and farsightedness. He knew from the outset that if he adopted a friendly and peaceful approach towards the local emirs, their fortresses, cities and emirates would continue to pose a threat to his emirate because of their proximity to it and their strategic locations, as they were located on high land that sloped towards Mosul, and on their other side were mountain chains, interconnected rivers and strong fortresses. Moreover, the isolationist policy followed by those emirs towards the Crusader threat that was advancing eastwards, and the resulting scattering of Muslim economic, military and human resources had rendered these emirates incapable of withstanding the encroaching Crusader threat. This was at a time when Zangi had to strive to remove the obstacles that stood in the way of uniting the divided and scattered emirates into one united Islamic front.